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Recent scholarship has brought into focus the downside risks of constitutionmaking moments. Ideally, constitution-making would help to establish or rejuvenate
a democratic order. But across a range of recent cases, constitution-making has
helped to erode democracy or to increase political tension, rather than strengthening
the democratic order and bridging political and social divisions. Would-be
authoritarian actors and movements can use a number of different devices to
undermine democracy, including the tools of constitutional change.1 Replacement
of the existing constitution may be a particularly efficient way for powerful actors
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1.
See David Landau, Abusive Constitutionalism, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 189, 191 (2013)
[hereinafter Landau, Abusive].

87

88

UC Irvine Journal of International, Transnational, and Comparative Law [Vol. 2:87

to entrench themselves, to weaken institutions intended to check their power and
protect minority rights, and to marginalize political opposition groups.
There are several well-studied recent examples. In both Venezuela and
Ecuador, powerful presidents (Hugo Chavez and Rafael Correa) rewrote
constitutions shortly after taking office and used the constitution-making process
as a way to weaken opposition groups and undermine democracy.2 In both cases,
the constitution-making process excluded the opposition and the resulting
constitutions strengthened presidential power while weakening the power of other
institutions.3 Similarly, in Hungary, the Fidesz party used its two-thirds majority in
Parliament to replace the existing constitution after having previously passed a series
of amendments designed to weaken the judiciary and otherwise undermine checks
on its power.4 The resulting constitution has again been criticized for entrenching
the ruling party and weakening institutions designed to limit its power.5
The high risks associated with constitution-making moments are related to the
difficulties of constraint at the domestic level. Constitution-making usually takes
place during periods of crisis or transition at which domestic institutions have
broken down or become broadly illegitimate; powerful leaders can take advantage
of the resulting vacuums to consolidate power in a durable way. A legal/conceptual
problem compounds this issue: leading theories of constitution-making hold that it
can properly take place outside of the existing constitutional order, via institutions
that cannot be controlled by existing institutions. Thus, not only does constitutionmaking usually take place at moments of domestic institutional weakness, but actors
can plausibly wield legal theories of constitution-making that undermine domestic
institutions even further. Even where risks of democratic erosion do not materialize,
the resulting uncertainty in even the basic legal framework can lead to a constitutionmaking environment exacerbating rather than lessening social and political tension.
The frequent absence of domestic legal constraint during constitution-making
moments may create a prima facie case for some form of supra-national intervention.
At the least, they demonstrate that such involvement might be useful. However,
achieving effective international involvement as a solution to abusive constitutionmaking seems much easier said than done. Strong international norms governing
constitution-making do not exist, may never exist, and perhaps should not exist.
Other approaches at the international or regional level are similarly either inchoate
or flawed. As a first step, the goal of this article is to survey the range of possibilities
and their potential for development, recognizing both the potential utility and
drawbacks of each approach.

2.
ALLAN BREWER-CARIAS, THE DISMANTLING OF DEMOCRACY IN VENEZUELA 39–40
(2010); David Landau, Constitution-Making Gone Wrong, 64 ALA. L. REV. 923, 939–40, 971 (2013)
[hereinafter Landau, Gone Wrong].
3. BREWER-CARIAS, supra note 2, at 57–60.
4. Miklós Bánkuti, Gábor Halmai, & Kim Lane Scheppele, Hungary’s Illiberal Turn: Disabling the
Constitution, 23 J. DEMOCRACY 138, 138–40 (2012).
5. Id. at 142–44.
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Part I of this article frames the problem of constraint at the domestic level
during constitution-making processes. While acknowledging that the issue is not
universal, it argues that the absence of effective constraint from domestic
institutions is a common one and that this absence is associated with a range of
longer-term problems including the erosion of democracy and the increase in
political tension associated with “failed” constitution-making. Part II considers the
strengths and drawbacks of four distinct models of international intervention: (1)
democracy clauses requiring that states abide by their own domestic mechanisms of
constitutional change, (2) international norms directly governing the procedure or
substance of constitution-making, (3) international organizations or NGOs wielding
“best practices,” and (4) review of constitution-making processes and texts by
advisory bodies at the supranational level. Part III concludes by arguing that since
the problem of abusive constitution-making is particularly difficult to solve at either
the domestic or international levels, the most feasible approach involves making
some use of all of these distinct tools while recognizing each of their limitations.
I.

CONSTITUTION-MAKING AND DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS

This Part argues that constitution-making moments often occur during unique
moments of stress and weakness for the domestic institutional order and, indeed
themselves can tend to contribute significantly to this stress on existing institutions.
Section A argues that constitution-making, whether undertaken during periods of
regime transition or within a democratic regime, is often associated with deep crises
that render existing institutions weak, illegitimate, or both. Section B argues that
prevailing legal and political theories of constitution-making tend to compound this
tendency by envisioning constitution-making as an act by “the people” outside of
existing constitutional and legal constraints. The effect of these dynamics is to make
constitution-making an activity that is particularly difficult to regulate at the
domestic level. As Section C notes, this absence of effective domestic constraint
can have very problematic consequences.
A. Institutional Dynamics
The first problem is practical: the political environment in which constitutionmaking is usually undertaken is one where existing institutions are either eroded,
have collapsed completely, or are badly tainted by association with the prior regime.
As Elster notes, the normal situation in which constitution-making occurs is not
where things are going well, but instead where some deep crisis necessitates the
creation of a new constitution.6 This is of course not inevitable: Chile represents an
ongoing case of a country seeking to rewrite its constitution during periods of

6.
(1995).

Jon Elster, Forces and Mechanisms in the Constitution-Making Process, 45 DUKE L.J. 364, 370
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relative institutional normalcy.7 And even where a crisis is occurring, as for example
recently in Iceland, political institutions may maintain sufficient force to block or
shape the constitution-making process.8 But very often, the crisis that spurs
constitution-making will also have undermined domestic political institutions.
This is easiest to see in cases of constitution-making during regime transition.
Some recent instances of constitution-making have occurred after the fall of
authoritarian regimes, and as a part of a transition process that would supposedly
end in a democratic order. In these instances, the problem is that all the old
institutions:—courts, legislatures, bureaucracies, the military, etc.—may be tainted
by association with the existing regime. In some cases, they may also have collapsed
or been gravely weakened through the dynamics preceding and contemporaneous
with the transition process. Scholarship suggests various ways in which actors might
work around this problem. Arato, for example, suggests a model of roundtable talks
followed by temporary constitutions that structure the transition process.9 This
model essentially makes use of authoritarian-era institutions and constitutions (as
often occurred in Eastern Europe), but breathes new life into them through the
results of the roundtable talks and gradually phases out old for new institutions.10
The institutions created by the new temporary constitution should have more
authority to restrain constitution-makers than would the institutions associated with
the old authoritarian regime.
But in many transitional cases, the preconditions for roundtable talks may not
be met: contending groups affiliated with both the old and new orders may not
agree on the basic contours of the process. In those conditions, the ability of the
authoritarian-era institutions to shape constitution-making may be very
problematic. In Egypt, for example, the military and the courts, holdovers from the
old order, tried to play a significant role in restraining constitution-making that was
controlled by two newly-constituted institutions: the Parliament and the
presidency.11 As examples, the military sought to insert substantive principles into
the process (with which any final constitution would need to comply), and the
courts issued significant decisions governing the composition of the Constituent
Assembly and dissolving it when it did not meet constitutional and legal
requirements.12 Ideally, the judiciary would be seen as an impartial arbitrator. But in
the Egyptian case, members of the judiciary were viewed as allies of interests

7. See Ryan Dube, Chile’s President Vows to Tackle Corruption, Rewrite Constitution, WALL ST. J. (Apr.
29, 2015, 11:23 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/chiles-president-vows-to-tackle-corruptionrewrite-constitution-1430321012.
8. See Hélène Landemore, Inclusive Constitution-Making: The Icelandic Experiment, 23 J. POL. PHIL.
166, 167–70 (2015).
9. ANDREW ARATO, CIVIL SOCIETY, CONSTITUTION, AND LEGITIMACY 149–50 (2000).
10. See id. at 145–48.
11.
Kristen R. Stilt, The End of “One Hand”: The Egyptian Constitutional Declaration and the Rift
between the “People” and the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, 16 Y.B. ISLAMIC & MIDDLE EASTERN L.
43, 44–49 (2012).
12. Id. at 56–58.
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associated with the old order (as well as promoters of its own corporatist interests),
which hampered its ability to impose legitimate constraints on the constitutionmaking process.13
Often overlooked is the similarity between transitional and democratic
constitution-making with respect to the weak or tainted nature of existing
institutions. Democratic constitutional replacement also tends to occur in moments
where institutions have either collapsed, been gravely weakened, or lost legitimacy.
The Andean region of Latin America—Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela, and
Bolivia—offers a recent example. Since 1991, a period in which each of these
countries has been consistently democratic, all four of them have adopted new
constitutions (twice in the case of Ecuador).14 In all of these cases, constitutionmaking was conducted in an environment of political crisis, in which existing
political institutions were seen as at least partly accountable. In Colombia in 1991,
Venezuela in 1999, and Bolivia beginning in 2006 and ending in 2009, constitutionmaking broadly took place as part of the end of “pacted” regimes or power-sharing
arrangements between rival parties15 In all cases (although to varying degrees), these
political arrangements were once seen as working fairly well but in recent years were
seen as increasingly corrupt as well as incapable of channeling social demands and
divergent social forces and providing public goods like stability and growth. In
Ecuador, both the 1998 and 2008 constitutions were preceded by periods of
extraordinary political instability in which, for example, democratically-elected
presidents were irregularly removed and could not complete their terms.16
By the time constitution-making was undertaken in these cases, and again to
varying degrees, the legitimacy of many existing political institutions was thus
suspect in all of them. In some, such as Colombia in 1991, ordinary political
institutions maintained some ability to influence the constitution-making process
(although the Constituent Assembly would eventually revoke the mandate of the
existing Congress).17 In others, like Venezuela, the old order had basically collapsed
by the time constitution-making occurred.18 After Hugo Chavez won the presidency
in 1998, he faced opposition control (from the residuals of the old pacted regime)
of most other institutions in the country (the Congress, the Supreme Court, and
most local governments, for example). But these institutions were able to exercise
virtually no influence over the constitution-making process which was entirely
13. Id. at 58.
14. BREWER-CALAIS, supra note 2, at 60, 72–73; Manuel Jose Cepeda-Espinosa, Judicial Activism
in a Violent Context: The Origin, Role, and Impact of the Colombian Constitutional Court, 3 WASH. U.
GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 529, 549 (2004); Catherine M. Conaghan, Ecuador: Correa’s Plebiscitary Presidency,
19 J. DEMOCRACY 46 (2008); Eduardo A. Gamarra, Bolivia: Evo Morales and Democracy, in
CONSTRUCTING DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN LATIN AMERICA 124, 139, 148–51 (Jorge I.
Dominguez & Michael Shifter, eds., 3d ed. 2008).
15. See BREWER-CARIAS, supra note 2, at 42–46; Cepeda-Espinosa, supra note 14, at 540–42,
548–49; Gamarra, supra note 14, at 127; Landau, Gone Wrong, supra note 2, at 963–64.
16. Conaghan, supra note 14, at 48.
17. See Landau, Abusive, supra note 1, at 200–03.
18. See Landau, Gone Wrong, supra note 2, at 939–40.
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controlled by Chavez’s forces. Indeed, as explained in more detail below, these
opposition-controlled institutions were eventually shut down or cleansed by the
Chavez-controlled Assembly.19 Similar dynamics occurred in Ecuador in 2008,
where the newly-ascendant President Correa and his allies were able to argue that
the existing institutional order was a large part of the national problem and needed
to be swept away.20 The broad point, then, is that in democratic constitution-making
as in transitional constitution-making, the institutional order is often very weak.
B. Conceptual Dynamics
Beyond the fact that institutions during constitution-making are often weak,
tainted, or both, theories of constitution-making also often contribute to making it
a process that is difficult to restrain. Perhaps the leading theory of constitutionmaking, building off Sieyes and Schmitt, is built around “constituent power.”21 The
basic idea here is that “the people” retain the ultimate power to remake their
institutional order. In writing a constitution, they delegate some of their power to
“constituted powers,” or ordinary political institutions. These institutions have the
power to make ordinary political decisions and even to carry out exercises of
constitutional change that fall short of constitutional replacement, for example by
using textual mechanisms for amendment. All of these acts are restrained by the
existing constitutional order. But the ultimate act of constitutional replacement can
be done by “the people” at any time, and can take place outside of the existing
constitutional order.
The basic theory of constituent power has some ramifications for the design
of constitution-making processes. Since constitution-making is supposed to take
place outside of the normal institutional rules, specialized bodies like constituent
assemblies may make more sense as constitution-makers than ordinary institutions
like legislatures. Moreover, these specialized institutions are not bound by the rules
and restraints put on them by other political institutions, but instead can define their
own operating rules and competencies. They cannot be regulated by the existing
constitutional rules or the existing institutional order. Indeed, since the Constituent
Assembly, once constituted, represents the sovereign power of the people, it can
limit or shut down the power of other institutions at will.
Some recent constitution-making experiences in the Andes represent a fairly
clear illustration of the constituent power approach. In Colombia (1991), Venezuela
(1999), and Ecuador (2008), political actors evoked the constituent power theory to
remake the institutional order.22 In all of these cases, designers followed processes
for constitutional replacement that were outside of the existing constitutional
19.
20.
21.

BREWER-CARIAS, supra note 2, at 73–74.
Conaghan, supra note 14, at 51–52, 54–56.
See, e.g., JOEL COLON-RIOS, WEAK CONSTITUTIONALISM: DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY
AND THE QUESTION OF CONSTITUENT POWER 84–86 (2012); see also Mark Tushnet, Peasants with
Pitchforks, or Toilers with Twitter, 13 INT’L J. CONST. L. 639, 645–46 (2014).
22. Landau, Abusive, supra note 1, at 207; Landau, Gone Wrong, supra note 2, at 941–43, 951–54.
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order.23 In each case, presidents called referenda on whether specialized constituent
assemblies should be called to rewrite constitutions. The assemblies, once
constituted, were not bound by any limitations that may have been placed on them
by the existing institutional order. And indeed, in all three cases they shut down
ordinary institutions so they could be remade or reconstituted.24
The Venezuelan case is perhaps emblematic: the newly elected President Hugo
Chavez (who was the driving force behind the assembly), went before it and laid
down his mandate, stating that he would only continue in office if ratified by the
Assembly (which of course he was, overwhelmingly).25 The assembly then used its
“original constituent power” to limit the power and composition of the Congress,
shut down the Supreme Court, and remove hostile local and union officials.26 It also
issued legislation directly. But constituent assemblies across all three countries
worked under similar dynamics. The only real difference was the political context—
Colombian constitution-making was extra-textual but based on a broad consensus
between political forces, while constitution-making in both Ecuador and Venezuela
was dominated by unilateral political forces associated with newly-elected presidents
in each case.27
Constitution-making under “constituent power” theories tends to make
restraint at the domestic level problematic. The reason is obvious: if constitutionmaking occurs outside, rather than inside, existing constitutional frameworks, then
existing political institutions may have limited or no ability to restrain constitutionmaking bodies. Indeed, the Constituent Assembly can plausibly claim an ability to
shut down any institution that interferes with its decisions. As much recent work
has argued, this may raise the risk of majoritarian constitution-making, where a text
is imposed by a bare majority on minority groups. Or it may allow for abusive
constitution-making by a powerful individual or party claiming to act on behalf of
the people.28 That constitution-maker, able to unilaterally remake the constitution,
may be able to entrench themselves in power and weaken institutions intended to
check their power. The result may be a regime that is less than fully democratic.
The risk of this outcome does not result from stepping outside of the existing
institutional order as such. Indeed, the act of stepping outside of the existing
constitutional order can be either useful or necessary for successful constitutionmaking. In transition cases, there may be little or no existing institutional order to
fall back on and restrained constitution-making may require bargains with actors

23.
See Maxwell A. Cameron & Kenneth E. Sharpe, Andean Left Turns: Constituent Power and
Constitution-Making, in LATIN AMERICA’S LEFT TURNS: POLITICS, POLICIES, & TRAJECTORIES OF
CHANGE 61, 62 (Maxwell A. Cameron & Eric Hershberg, eds., 2010).
24. Id. at 66–69; Landau, Abusive, supra note 1, at 192.
25. See BREWER-CARIAS, supra note 2, at 49–50.
26. See id. at 57–59.
27.
For example, the Colombian Assembly also revoked the mandate of the legislature and
called for new elections, and the Ecuadorian Assembly revoked the mandate of various institutions. See
Landau, Abusive, supra note 1, at 207.
28. See id. at 191.
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that are too tainted by affiliation with the authoritarian regime. Even in democratic
cases, constituent power theory can provide a useful exit in situations where the
existing institutional order threatens to freeze or block important changes—both
Colombia and Venezuela, which were pacted regimes that had run their course,
offer plausible examples.29 More recently, Iceland offers a plausible example of a
case where political elites blocked a needed constitutional replacement, and
constitution-makers thus may have been better off proceeding via extraconstitutional rather than constitutional channels.30 The exit function of
constitution-making via constituent power theory can be a true advantage.
The problem instead may be that once constitution-makers step outside of the
existing political order, there is no other obvious source of restraint. Political leaders
may choose, or be forced because of circumstances, to form multi-party agreements
or act by relative consensus. The 1991 Constituent Assembly in Colombia offers an
example: the process took place outside of the existing constitutional framework
but was governed by a multi-party pact between major political forces.31 In contrast,
in the Venezuelan and Ecuadorian cases powerful, political actors—in both cases
the president—largely acted unilaterally and marginalized opposition political
forces.32
Theorists have discussed various ways in which restraint might exist within a
constituent power framework. One possibility is to allow political actors to step
outside of the existing constitutional framework but to allow or require regulation
by existing political institutions. This has been the tradition, for example, in many
of the U.S. states, where limited constituent assemblies governed by rules set by
legislatures have been fairly common.33 Another possibility is to have courts or
other domestic institutions use the theoretical construct of “constituent power” to
limit abusive exercises of constitution-making. Not just any act of power is plausibly
in the name of “the people.” Courts might step in, for example, to verify that
sufficient support exists to call an assembly, or to ensure that the process itself
reflects a sufficient level of consensus.34 The Venezuelan Supreme Court attempted
mild restrictions along these lines, although with little success.35 Suffice it to say that
in comparative terms, restrictions along either line appear to be fairly difficult to
impose on constitution-making processes, even if they are theoretically possible.
The theory tends to marginalize existing political institutions (as noted above), and
29. See Landau, Gone Wrong, supra note 2, at 963–64; Renata Segura & Ana Maria Bejarano, Ni
una asamblea mas sin nosotros! Exclusion, Inclusion, and the Politics of Constitution-Making in the Andes, 11
CONSTELLATIONS 217, 219–20 (2004).
30. See Landemore, supra note 8, at 167–70.
31. See Cepeda-Espinosa, supra note 14, at 540–42, 548–49.
32. See Landau, Gone Wrong, supra note 2.
33.
See William Partlett, The American Tradition of Constituent Power (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
34. See David Landau & Rosalind Dixon, Constraining Constitutional Change, 50 WAKE FOR. L.
REV. 859, 876–79 (2015).
35.
See id.; see also Joshua Braver, Hannah Arendt in Venezuela: The Supreme Court Battles Hugo
Chávez Over the Creation of the 1999 Constitution, 14 INT’L J. CONST. L. 555, 557 (2016).
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it may provide relatively little guidance as to what levels of support are necessary
for constitution-making. For example, it may not be able to easily adjudicate
between a majoritarian and a consensus-based constitution-making process, since
either kind of process can plausibly claim to represent “popular will.”
Constituent power theory is not, of course, the only theory under which recent
constitution-making has occurred. One might call an alternative theory a “rule of
law” approach, which is in a sense the opposite of the constituent power approach.36
Rather than being carried out outside of the existing constitutional order,
constitution-making occurs inside and is restrained by the existing constitutional
text. Some constitutions, for example, contain replacement clauses that govern the
process by which new constitutions can be made: some acts of constitution-making
turn to these clauses and in other cases, political actors get together and agree on
changes to the existing constitution that will govern a foreseen act of new
constitution-making. Comparative evidence suggests that this form of constitutionmaking is also fairly common.37 Nonetheless, I do not think it provides a cure-all
for the problems identified with constituent power theory, for several reasons.
First, replacement clauses appear to be uncommon. Most constitutions appear
to say nothing about their own replacement: they contain amendment mechanisms
but do not regulate the constitution-making process.38 Such a constitutional text
might, of course, be interpreted so as to disallow wholesale replacement, a position
that might prove unstable. Or they can collapse into a constituent power approach,
in which case the regulated approach becomes unregulated. Furthermore, even
where replacement clauses or similar devices exist, they often seem to be unstable
and contestable. The regulation, rather than serving as a focal point or object of
consensus, can become a tool wielded by one side (generally a minority group or
threatened elite), while the other side argues that the regulation is not binding
because of the nature of the constitution-making process. Rather than stabilizing
constitution-making processes, in other words, regulations can, under certain
conditions, destabilize them.
The example of Bolivia is an interesting one in this respect. There a president
installed a replacement clause in 2004, during a deep political crisis, which essentially
required a special congressional law approved by two-thirds of the Congress to
trigger and regulate a constitution-making process by constituent assembly.39 A
short time but two crisis-laden presidencies later, President Evo Morales took
power at the head of an insurgent political party backed by indigenous movements
and other traditionally-excluded groups.40 Morales sought constitutional

36.
See Richard Stacey, Constituent Power and Carl Schmitt’s Theory of Constitution in Kenya’s
Constitution-making Process, 9 J. INT’L CONST. L. 587, 599 (2011).
37. Landau, Gone Wrong, supra note 2, at 961.
38. See id.
39.
See generally, Fabrice Lehoucq, Bolivia’s Constitutional Breakdown, 19 J. DEMOCRACY 110
(2008).
40. Id.
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replacement, as did broad sectors of the opposition. The two sides initially agreed
on a special law to regulate the process, which among other things called for a twothirds vote in the resulting Constituent Assembly to approve any constitutional
draft.41 But as the process dragged on, battles erupted between the allies of President
Morales (who had a majority but lacked a two-thirds supermajority in the assembly),
and the opposition. The former insisted that the assembly had “original constituent
power” and thus could adopt rules and procedures that differed from those found
in the congressional enabling law, while the latter argued that the process was a
regulated one that must be carried out within existing constitutional and legal rules.42
The result was a process in which the rules influenced the text but were constantly
in danger of being bent or ignored.43 A constitution was finally adopted after a
tortured three-year process, but the final draft was hammered out by negotiations
in the Congress.44
The constituent power doctrine has in recent years been particularly influential
in the Andes. But the threat of “constituent power” or similar discourses to
regulated constitution-making processes appears to be a global phenomenon. Take
two examples of constitution-making during political transition. In Russia, the
legislature and high courts likewise attempted to regulate a constitution-making
process that would be carried out within existing constitutional rules.45 However,
President Yeltsin eventually won, using the results of a referendum to lift the
process out of these ordinary institutions and placing it instead in a Constituent
Assembly appointed by him.46 Critics of the Russian process have argued that the
resulting constitution helped shaped Russia into a hybrid regime that was less than
fully democratic.47
Similarly and more recently, the Egyptian constitution-making process in 2012
emerged at times as a battle between the military and the courts, which sought to
place the constitution-making process under the regulation of the existing
constitution and ordinary laws (by for example imposing “constitutional principles”
on the process and by dissolving the Assembly when the judiciary determined it had
been improperly conformed), and the majoritarian political forces surrounding
President Mohamed Morsi, who argued that the sweeping electoral mandate of
them and their allies should legitimate the process.48 The Morsi side eventually
pushed through the constitution using “constituent power” logic: it immunized the
work of the Assembly from any judicial challenges, enabling to finish the draft.

41.
Ley Especial de Convocatoria a la Asamblea Constituyente, Mar. 6, 2006, http://www
.lexivox.org/norms/BO-L-3364.pdf.
42. For a summary, see Landau, Gone Wrong, supra note 2.
43. See generally Lehouqc, supra note 40.
44. See Landau, Gone Wrong, supra note 2, at 939.
45. William Partlett, The Dangers of Popular Constitution-Making, 38 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 193 (2012).
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. See Nathan Brown, Tracking the Arab Spring: Egypt’s Failed Transition, 24 J. DEMOCRACY 45
(2013).
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However, the Morsi government was shortly thereafter removed in a coup.49 The
point here is not to evaluate any particular constitution-making process: in some of
these cases the end result was at least passable (as in Bolivia), while in others the
dynamic was plausibly disastrous (as in Egypt). The point instead is that even in a
supposedly “regulated” constitution-making process, the ideology surrounding it
can put pressure on the basic institutional rules.
One final point is also worth noting: even where replacement clauses exist and
are adhered to, they may do relatively little to ensure that the values one would want
to achieve in a constitution-making process are met. That is, regulation is far from
assurance that a constitution-making process is a “good” one. Take the example of
Hungary. During the transition to democracy, parties used the amendment rules
found in the old, communist-era constitution: a two-thirds majority.50 The new
constitutional text was thought to be temporary, however, and to exist only until a
wholly new constitution could be written. In 1995, the parliament added a clause
requiring that the permanent constitution be approved by a four-fifths vote.51 The
Fidesz party won over two-thirds of seats with just over a majority of votes in 2009;
this vote total gave them the ability to amend the constitution unilaterally.52 Using
their supermajority, they amended many parts of the constitution, including
provisions dealing with judicial power.53 They also repealed the four-fifths clause,
and then used a two-thirds vote to completely replace the existing constitution with
a new one in 2011.54
Depending on the legal status of the four-fifths clause, of course, the
legitimacy of this process could be contested.55 (It makes little conceptual sense to
allow legislative actors to remove a more entrenched provision with a lesser vote).
But even assuming Fidesz acted properly, the two-thirds clause would have failed
to ensure that the process was consensual and deliberative. The scholarly consensus
instead is that the text was rushed through parliament unilaterally with virtually no
debate and no participation or input from opposition groups.56 One problem with
replacement clauses is that they may have very different effects depending on the
exact contours of the political system. A threshold that might require broad
consensus in some political environments (such as where fragmentation is high and
parties are fluid, which was the case shortly after the Hungarian transition), might
work very differently in other political contexts where one political party is able to

49. See id.
50. See Andrew Arato, Post-Sovereign Constitution-Making in Hungary: After Success, Partial Failure,
26 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 19 (2010).
51.
There is some debate about whether this clause had a sunset date or, once added, was
permanent. See Andrew Arato, Post-Sovereign Constitution-Making in Hungary: After Success, Partial Failure,
26 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 19 (2010).
52. Id. at 29.
53. Miklós Bánkuti, et al., Disabling the Constitution, 23 J. DEMOCRACY 138, 139 (2012).
54. See Arato, supra note 52.
55. Bánkuti, et al., Disabling the Constitution, 23 J. DEMOCRACY 138, 139 (2012).
56. See id.
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gain broad power. The insensitivity of replacement clauses to changes in political
context might make them particularly problematic as time passes.57
C. Problems Caused by an Absence of Domestic Institutional Constraint
The link between process and outcome is notoriously difficult to draw with
respect to constitution-making, even for basic variables like levels of public
participation and inclusion.58 The ability to draw causal inferences of the effect of a
particular constitution-making process is plagued both by problems of endogeneity
(the constitution-making process is not randomly selected, but is likely to reflect
preexisting patterns of political support) and context-dependence (the effect of any
particular design choice is likely to depend heavily on many other features of the
political and social context). Nonetheless, the absence of effective domestic
constraints appears to be associated with two kinds of problems across a range of
cases. These problems are not inevitable: in some cases, despite the absence of
domestic legal regulation, the parties may agree on the process or otherwise reach a
good outcome. But they appear to be common enough to warrant concern.
The first potential problem is unilateral control of constitution-making
processes by particular individuals or parties, which can lead to “abusive” forms of
constitution-making that undermine democracy. Much recent work, drawn from a
range of sources including Venezuela, Russia, and Hungary, has argued that
unilateral domination of the constitution-making process can undermine an existing
or nascent democratic order.59 The hegemonic actor who controls that process may
be able to shape the constitutional text so that they are more difficult to dislodge,
tilting the playing field in any future elections. They may also be able to weaken or
pack control institutions that are designed to limit their power and to protect the
rights of minority groups. Finally, constitution-making may act as a critical juncture
that allows ascendant political actors to weaken the power of their political
opponents by rapidly removing them from institutional power bases. Put simply, in
certain political contexts unrestrained constitution-making raises significant risks of
democratic erosion.60
A second problem is related to an increased risk of political and social conflict
because of an absence of clear ground rules. During moments of ordinary political
contestation, contending actors may disagree on their programs but agree on which
channels and methods may be used to seek power, as well as which institutions are
charged with making decisions in the event of political disagreement. A peculiar
feature of constitution-making can be to weaken or eliminate the institutions that
57. For a similar critique of amendment rules giving special protection to certain clauses, see
Rosalind Dixon & David Landau, Transnational Constitutionalism and a Limited Doctrine of Unconstitutional
Constitutional Amendment, 13 INT’L J. CONST. L. 606 (2015).
58. See, e.g., Tom Ginsburg, et al., Does the Process of Constitution-Making Matter? 5 ANN. REV. L.
& SOC. SCI. 201 (2009); and Gabriel Negretto, Replacing and Amending Constitutions: The Logic of
Constitutional Change in Latin America, 46 L. & SOC’Y REV. 749 (2012).
59. See Landau, Gone Wrong, supra note 2, at 940.
60. See Landau, Abusive, supra note 1, at 191.
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normally channel these disagreements. Given that constitution-making also
normally takes place in an atmosphere of political crisis, the inability to agree even
on basic ground rules can heighten tensions between competing groups.
The Bolivian case referred to above offers one example of such a dynamic. At
the outset of the constitution-making process in Bolivia, there were significant
tensions between the forces of the new President Morales and the opposition.61
These tensions were based on region, ethnicity, centralization vs. decentralization,
and economics, among other issues.62 But both sides agreed on the need for a new
constitution, and their goals may not have been so distinct as to make agreement
impossible. The process of constitution-making was greatly inflamed by disputes
about whether the Constituent Assembly had original constituent power, who
would get to determine its rules, and how these rules should be interpreted.63 The
process ended up heightening political tension between the two groups rather than
enabling compromise.64 Similarly, in Egypt, debates about the basic parameters of
the process, and particularly whether the Assembly was subject to legal control from
the judiciary, inflamed disputes between competing groups and plausibly made it
more difficult for the political parties who held a democratic majority to
compromise with elements of the old regime and democratic minorities.65
II.

CONSTITUTION-MAKING AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: A CRITICAL
REVIEW OF APPROACHES

The prior part argued that domestic institutions are particularly weak during
constitution-making moments, which may make the existence of supra-national
support especially useful. This part surveys existing approaches that might help
provide such support. It considers several different possibilities: (1) “democracy
clauses” that police whether a state has followed its own rules; (2) international
norms governing the procedure or substance of constitution-making; (3)
international organizations and NGOs carrying best practices; and (4) advisory
institutions at the international level. The analysis concludes that each of these
approaches may have some promise at limiting abusive acts of constitution-making,
but that all also have serious pitfalls. In the end, scholars and constitutional
designers may achieve the best results from an approach that seeks modest gains
from several different models.

61. Id.
62. See generally Lehouqc, supra note 39.
63. Id.
64. See Landau, Gone Wrong, supra note 2, at 971. Indeed, at one point the tension became so
bad that the process broke down completely over a peripheral but emotional issue: a proposal to move
the capital to Sucre, where the Constituent Assembly was sitting.
65. See generally Brown, supra note 48.
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A. Democracy Clauses and Legality

Perhaps the most straightforward approach would be an order that domestic
actors need to follow their own rules. This approach has several advantages. Most
importantly, it is most consonant with what already exists: several regional
organizations, including Latin America and Africa, have democracy clauses.66 These
are normally tied to the constitutionality of action taken. The Latin American clause,
found in article 20 of the Inter-American Democratic Charter, allows for the
suspension of member states in the event of an “unconstitutional alteration of the
constitutional regime that seriously impairs the democratic order in a member
state”67 Similarly, article 25 of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and
Governance calls for suspension in the event of an “unconstitutional change of
government,”68 and the Commonwealth nations similarly commit to action after
an ”unconstitutional overthrow of a democratically elected government.”69 Thus,
many regions have a clause that requires that certain fundamental actions—changes
in regime or governance—be handled in a constitutional manner.70
This kind of approach is also consonant with some proposals for bringing
fundamental issues of domestic constitutional governance into the international
realm. Ex-Tunisian President Moncef Marzouki’s proposal for an International
Constitutional Court, for example, referred to “abuse” of political power by
domestic actors and the prevention of “illegitimate, bogus elections.”71 Marzouki’s
suggestion is that at least a large part of the Court’s work would be in preventing
political leaders from taking actions that violate their own domestic rules.
The normative attractiveness of such an approach stems from the fact that it
does not require international actors to construct a set of procedural or substantive
norms, but instead simply requires that countries abide by rules they have already
set in place. In that sense, this approach seeks to close the gap between the way
national leaders say they will behave and the way they actually behave. However, at
least when it comes to constitution-making, the normative attractiveness of the
model is often overcome by two crippling problems: (1) the difficulty of figuring
66.
See generally Theodore J. Piccone, International Mechanisms for Protecting Democracy, in
PROTECTING DEMOCRACY: INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES 101 (Morton H. Halperin & Mirna Galic,
eds., 2005).
67.
Inter-American Democratic Charter art. 20, Sept. 11, 2001, https://www.oas.org/en
/democratic-charter/pdf/demcharter_en.pdf.
68.
African Charter on Elections, Democracy, and Governance art. 25, Jan. 30, 2007,
http://au.int/en/sites/default/files/treaties/7790-file-african_charter_on_democracy_elections_and
_governance.pdf
69. Millbrook Commonwealth Action Programme on the Harare Declaration art. 3, Nov. 12,
1995,
http://thecommonwealth.org/sites/default/files/history-items/documents/millbrook%20
declaration.pdf
70. The Andean Community and Mercosur also include such clauses. See Piccone, supra note
66, at 108–09.
71.
Press Release, General Assembly, General Assembly Session Pivotal If World Leaders
Ensure Effective Custodianship of Environment, Economic Justice, Social Responsibility, Speaker Says
in Debate, U.N. Press Release GA/11562 (Sept. 25, 2014), http://www.un.org/press/en/2014
/ga11562.doc.htm.

2017]

Democratic Erosion and Constitution-Making Moments

101

out when a country has violated its own constitutional rules, and (2) the potential
irrelevance of whether a country has followed its settled rules on the question of
constitution-making
The first problem afflicts any act of what Dixon and Jackson call
“extraterritorial constitutional interpretation.”72 While judging the constitutionality
of an act may be fairly easy at times (a military coup is a paradigmatic example), very
often it requires difficult issues in judgment. In those cases, actors tend to accept
the decisions of final constitutional interpreters such as high courts not because they
are definitely correct, but simply because of their procedural position. External
interpreters lack the formal procedural authority to act as final constitutional
interpreters. They also may lack necessary knowledge about the rules and legal
culture of a system in which they were not trained and have not practiced.73
These problems tend to be particularly acute in exercises of constitutional
change and constitution-making. The reasons why the problems tend to be
particularly acute were reviewed in the prior part. Constitutional texts often say little
or nothing about their own replacement. Moreover, whether they are silent or not,
political leaders may be able to use constituent power doctrine to carry out an act
of constitution-making outside of the existing constitutional framework.74 Whether
a given act of constitution-making is thus “legal” or “constitutional” will often
involve highly contestable theoretical judgments about the scope of the constituent
power doctrine in a given context.
An example from Honduras may be helpful to make this more concrete. In
2009, then-President Manuel Zelaya announced that he would seek a process of
constitutional replacement of the existing 1982 constitution. Zelaya sought a
plebiscite, which he later renamed a “nonbinding poll,” on whether to move
forward with the replacement of the existing constitution.75 Since Zelaya did not
enjoy congressional support, he tried to move forward unilaterally.76 The results of
the poll would be counted by the National Institute of Statistics (not the Electoral
Courts as with ordinary elections) and used to leverage the Congress into approving
binding steps to move towards a possible constituent assembly.77
The administrative, electoral, and civil courts all issued decisions at different
points holding that Zelaya could not move forward with the nonbinding poll.78
Their core reasoning was that Zelaya lacked the authority to go forward with a non-

72. Vicki C. Jackson & Rosalind Dixon, Constitutions Inside Out: Outsider Interventions in Domestic
Constitutional Contests, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 149 (2013).
73. See id.
74. Landau, Gone Wrong, supra note 2, at 962.
75.
See generally Noah Feldman et al., REPORT TO THE COMMISSION ON TRUTH AND
RECONCILIATION OF HONDURAS: CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES (Mar. 19, 2011), http://papers.ssrn.com
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1915214.
76. See id. at 5.
77. See id.
78. See id. at 30.
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binding poll, since such an instrument did not exist under Honduran law.79 Critics
outside of the courts, which included virtually all of the domestic political class, also
made a much broader argument: that although he was not explicit on the point,
Zelaya was actually trying to change the country’s one-term limit, which was
textually unamendable by any means, and therefore that the entire process of
constitutional replacement was unconstitutional regardless of what route would be
taken.80 After Zelaya nonetheless moved forward with preparations, high military
officials came to his house in the morning several days before the poll and put him
on a plane to Costa Rica. Congress met later that day and named the president of
Congress as the new national president; Zelaya was never restored to power.81
The Organization of American States (“OAS”) activated the democracy clause
in response to the military coup removing Zelaya, suspending Honduras from the
organization for two years as a result.82 Some analysts have argued that the OAS
also should have utilized or threatened to activate the democracy clause in response
to the actions of President Zelaya before the coup.83 One problem, though, is that
while it was reasonable to suppose the Zelaya’s actions may have posed a threat of
democratic erosion, it was more difficult to determine whether his actions were
“constitutional” or “unconstitutional.” The sequence of events proposed by Zelaya
to carry out constitutional replacement was somewhat like that which had been
proposed and carried out in Colombia in 1991, although under very different
political conditions: a non-binding poll carried out outside of the legal order,
followed by a binding referendum, followed by a constituent assembly.84 Whether
preexisting legal authority was necessary for each of these steps is a difficult legal
question. Even more difficult is the underlying question of whether the

79. See id.
80. See id. at 92.
81. See id. at 61.
82. Interestingly, the removal triggered a non-trivial debate about the legality of the actions of
the military. Those who supported the removal of Zelaya made various arguments: they argued that an
arrest warrant for the president had already been issued by the Supreme Court, which is explicitly given
the power to try, suspend, and remove the president under the Honduran constitution, and that the
military was a proper entity to serve that warrant given the president’s stature. They also argued that
the president violated a special constitutional provision stating that anyone seeking to change the
country’s strict one-term presidential term limit would “immediately cease in office.” See id.; see also
CONST. HOND. art. 239 (prohibiting anyone who has previously served as president from serving again
and stating that “[h]e who br[eaks] this provision or propose[s] its reform, as well as those who support
directly or indirectly [that effort], [will] . . . immediately [cease to occupy] . . . their respective
positions. . ..”). While I was part of a team that rejected these arguments during the Truth and
Reconciliation process, the fact that they could be made shows that even judging the constitutionality
of military coups – the classic form of extraconstitutional act – may not always be simple. See also
Jackson & Dixon, supra note 72, at 1–76 (arguing that the legality of those who removed Zelaya was at
least contestable).
83.
See JAVIER EL-HAGE, HUMAN RIGHTS FOUNDATION, THE FACTS AND THE LAW
BEHIND THE DEMOCRATIC CRISIS OF HONDURAS, 2009: A CONSTITUTIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
DEMOCRACY LAW ANALYSIS 158 (March 2010) http://humanrightsfoundation.org/uploads/The
_Facts_And_The_Law_Honduras_2009.pdf
84. See Cepeda-Espinosa, supra note 14, at 540–42.
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“unamendable” one-term limit could be removed or rewritten via constitutional
replacement. It is certainly plausible to argue that the petrified clause could not be
changed via the textual mechanisms of constitutional amendment, but making it
untouchable even by constituent assembly, effectively cutting off any route of
change, is a different thing.85
This leaves one key argument: Zelaya’s actions were different from those of
other contexts where extra-constitutional mechanisms were used—like Venezuela,
Colombia, and Ecuador—because the courts in those other countries either
approved the mechanisms or were silent, while the Honduran courts issued several
orders for Zelaya to stand down.86 These judicial orders are certainly relevant, but
they do not make the problem of extraterritorial constitutional interpretation go
away, even where relevant judgments have been issued (often courts will simply
avoid weighing in). The problem in the Honduran case is that virtually the entire
judiciary was aligned with other members of the political elite and against Zelaya.
Indeed, after the coup, the president of the Supreme Court gave interviews to the
national and international press defending it, and the court issued several decisions
legitimating the coup under Honduran constitutional law. 87 At least in
circumstances like those, which are fairly common during moments of constitutionmaking, the international community cannot without further examination accept
the verdict of the domestic courts as the last word on the matter. They are
participants, not simply arbitrators.
Even putting aside the difficulties with extraterritorial constitutional
interpretation during moments of constitution-making, there is a separate problem:
whether a system follows its own rules may be basically orthogonal to the underlying
procedural values that one would want to promote. The dangers to democracy that
are posed by a process of constitutional replacement may not depend precisely on
whether or not that process is “legal” under the existing constitutional order.
Insisting on legality may in some cases be used as a tool to block a desirable process,
while in other cases adherence to the formal procedural rules may do little to ensure

85. The complexities of the interpretation of the petrified clause were made clear several years
later – in a 2015 decision, the Honduran Supreme Court held that the one-term limit, as well as the
clause making it unamendable by any means, were themselves unconstitutional and it excised them
from the constitutional text. Among other arguments, the Court found that the petrified clause
threatened to prevent any peaceful mechanism of constitutional change. See David Landau, Honduras:
Term Limits Drama 2.0 - How the Supreme Court Declared the Constitution Unconstitutional,
CONSTITUTIONNET (May 27, 2015), http://www.constitutionnet.org/news/honduras-term-limitsdrama-20-how-supreme-court-declared-constitution-unconstitutional.
86.
See BREWER-CARIAS, supra note 2, at 73; William C. Banks & Edgar Alvarez, The New
Colombian Constitution: Democratic Victory or Popular Surrender?, 23 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 39, 59–
60 (1991); FELDMAN ET AL., supra note 75, at 38; David Landau, Term Limits Manipulation Across Latin
America - and What Constitutional Design Could Do About it, CONSTITUTIONNET, (Jul. 21, 2015),
http://www.constitutionnet.org/news/term-limits-manipulation-across-latin-america-and-whatconstitutional-design-could-do-about-it
87. For details, see Feldman, supra note 75, at 19.
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such a process. Even a relatively close monitoring of legality or constitutionality may
thus do little to improve outcomes.
The Colombian case offers a good example: as already noted, in 1991 the
political elite used extra-textual means to replace the 1886 constitution, since the
existing text contained no provision whatsoever allowing for a constituent
assembly.88 Indeed, in a prior case from the 1970s the Supreme Court had struck
down an attempt to delegate certain powers of constitutional change to such an
assembly, holding that the method of constitutional change found in the
constitution (approval by congress in two separate sessions by first a simple and
then an absolute majority) was exclusive.89 In the lead-up to the Constituent
Assembly of 1991, the Supreme Court changed its doctrine and allowed the
sequence of events resulting in the calling of the Constituent Assembly on the
grounds of original constituent power.90
Imagine, however, a counterfactual scenario in which the Court had struck
down the Assembly and the political elite had moved forward anyway, or in which
an international body had believed the action to be “unconstitutional” despite the
legitimation of the country’s high court. A decision blocking the constitutional
process would have likely prevented an exit from a deep political crisis, since the
Congress and Supreme Court had stopped many previous efforts at constitutional
change, leading critics to call Colombia in the 1980s a “blocked society.”91 And it
would have stopped a process that, despite using extra-textual mechanisms, was
highly consensual rather than unilateral: the resulting text was the result of broad
agreement between various political movements, representing both the old party
system and new insurgents. It also included input from a wide range of civil society
groups. Finally, the resulting constitution has been widely praised as strengthening
rather than weakening Colombian democracy.92
Alternatively, there are cases where procedural rules have been followed but
the process nonetheless raised significant risks of democratic erosion. The
Hungarian case mentioned above is a good example – the Fidesz party arguably
followed the relevant rules by gaining a two-thirds vote, but those rules allowed it
to unilaterally dominate the process of constitutional replacement, resulting in a
process that was neither deliberative nor inclusive, and which arguably worked a
significant erosion of democracy in that country.93
The fact that democracy clauses will sometimes be of little use in regulating
constitution-making need not mean that this will always be the case. The point is
simply that the attractiveness and feasibility of insisting on adherence to legality is
88.
89.

See Cepeda-Espinosa, supra note 14, at 545–47.
See MARIO CAJAS SARRIA, EL CONTROL JUDICIAL A LA REFORMA CONSTITUCIONAL:
COLOMBIA, 1910–2007 (2008).
90. See id.
91. See Mario Latorre Rueda, Colombia: una sociedad bloqueada, in PARTIDOS Y ELECCIONES EN
COLOMBIA 173 (Felipe Botero, ed., 2011).
92. See Segura & Bejarano, supra note 29, at 232.
93. See Bánkuti et al., supra note 4, at 139–40.
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very contextual. Imagine, for example, a case where the major political actors agree
on a roadmap for a constitution-making process just before such a process is
initiated. During the process, however, one of the actors (for example, a powerful
president or party) reneges on the deal and changes the process in some substantial
respect. In such a case, where domestic institutions are too weak to stop this action,
it may make sense for international actors to insist that the existing legal roadmap
be followed. Any legal claim to make a unilateral break with such a recently enacted
procedural norm is probably weak, and the roadmap itself seems likely associated
with positive normative values (democracy and social peace, for example) that could
be imperiled by unilateral constitution-making. Even this use, however, would be a
substantial expansion of the clauses beyond their current focus on military coups
and similarly flagrantly illegal devices.94
B. Procedural or Substantive International Norms
Some work has suggested that norms are emerging at the international level to
govern either the process of constitution-making or the substance of constitutional
texts. While it is possible that at some stage such norms would emerge, it is clear
that we are far from such a situation. Moreover, it is unclear whether international
norms of this type would be ineffective or even counterproductive.
The most commonly cited norm said to be emerging to govern the process of
constitution-making, based both on treaties and custom, is one in favor of public
participation.95 It is not clear, though, how far such a norm would extend or what
exactly it would encompass. Hart, for example, argues that the right could plausibly
include three clusters of activities: electing representatives, voting in referenda, and
offering input into the constitutional text.96 She notes that there is no clear guidance
as to which mix of these forms of participation is appropriate in different
circumstances.97 I will not, at any rate, analyze the question of whether such a norm
exists or is emerging at the international level; I will instead simply point out that
even if it were in the process of formation, it may not be an unalloyed good for
domestic constitution-making.
Many commentators have focused on the ambiguity in the concept of public
participation in constitution-making. It encompasses a range of different activities,
some more “active” and others more “passive.”98 Moreover, it appears to be easy
to design popular participation mechanisms so that they appear to be robust, but
94. See Piccone, supra note 66, at 233.
95. See Thomas M. Franck & Arun K. Thiruvengadam, Norms of International Law Relating to the
Constitution-Making Process, in FRAMING THE STATE IN TIMES OF TRANSITION: CASE STUDIES IN
CONSTITUTION MAKING 3, 3 (Laurel E. Miller, ed., 2010); see also Vivien Hart, Constitution Making and
the Right to Take Part in a Public Affair, supra, at 20; Abrak Saati, Participatory Constitution-Making as a
Transnational Legal Norm: Why Does It “Stick” in Some Contexts and Not in Others?, 2 U.C. IRVINE J. INT’L
TRANSNAT’L AND COMP. L. 113 (2017).
96. See Hart, supra note 95, at 42–44.
97. See id.
98. See, e.g., Ginsburg & Elkins, supra note 58, at 214–19.
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actually play a function that is closer to window-dressing. Referenda or elections are
of course very sensitive to the precise voting rules chosen, and can also be
manipulated through outright fraud or subtler forms of influence. More active
forms of participation, such as holding consultation sessions or encouraging
popular input into the constitutional text, also vary widely. In some cases these may
exercise significant influence on the final constitutional text. In others, however,
their actual influence may be slight. In yet a third case, popularly-supported
provisions, such as those governing constitutional rights, may actually be used as
compensation for other provisions that support authoritarianism.99 So a mere
requirement of participation, without much greater teeth, may do little to improve
the outcomes of constitution-making.
In fairness, those supporting the emergence of such a requirement
acknowledge its ambiguity—they argue that further practice will be needed to define
its contours. But even a well-developed right to popular participation may involve
tradeoffs that have not fully been processed in existing work. The empirical
literature gives little guidance as to which aspects of constitution-making actually
result in more desirable outcomes. Some recent work suggests that public
participation is correlated with those outcomes, while other work suggests more
skepticism about their effect. At least in some cases, for example, inclusion of a full
range of political elites – all or most major parties or movements – at the bargaining
table may be more important than the level or type of popular participation in the
constitution-making process. In those cases, an international mandate for popular
participation may overshadow more important concerns.
More dramatically, pushing towards popular participation may actually make
it less likely that designers of a process will achieve other goals. Some recent
empirical work suggests that levels of popular participation are actually used to
compensate for low levels of inclusion: when key sectors of political elite are
excluded from a constitution-making process, constitutional designers compensate
for this shortcoming by including passive forms of participation, like referenda, or
more active forms, like popular input into the text.100 Although participation and
inclusion may act as substitutes for constitutional designers seeking legitimacy, they
are not necessarily equivalent in terms of their effect on outcomes: leaving out a
significant sector of the political elite may be especially destabilizing. Furthermore,
as Elster points out, some forms of participation may also make it more difficult to
reach elite consensus because different factions will be forced to play to their
political bases rather than deliberating and compromising privately.101 Many of the
Eastern European constitutions in the 1990s were written with relatively low levels

99.
Something like this may have happened in the 2008 constitution-making process in
Ecuador, which both contained a large number of rights and instantiated a competitive authoritarian
regime led by President Correa.
100. See Negretto, supra note 58.
101. See Elster, supra note 6, at 388.
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of public participation but high levels of inclusion through round table talks and
similar devices, in part because of this perceived need.102
None of this is meant to argue that popular participation in constitutionmaking is a bad thing. Some empirical work suggests that it does improve outcomes,
although too little to make any definitive claims.103 It may also be possible to design
participation so that trade-offs do not materialize or are less sharp. Some analysts
have argued, for example, for an hour-glass shaped form of participation in which
levels are high at the beginning of the process (to activate it and determine its basic
procedural and substantive shape) and the end (to legitimate it), but lower in the
middle to allow elite bargaining.104 In particular contexts, this proposal or another
one may make sense. But the imposition of a robust and more specific
“participation” norm at the international level is at best premature and at worst may
impose too much uniformity on design choices that should properly be dependent
on context. We have not yet developed a plausible list of best practices in
constitution-making, if such a list is even feasible.
Perhaps even more difficult would be the emergence of substantive norms or
practices governing the content of constitutional texts. Given that democratic
governance itself is not an international right, the possibility of international norms
governing aspects of constitutional texts may seem very unlikely at least at the
international rather than the regional level. But even if the emergence of such norms
were more imaginable, it is doubtful that they could be designed in an effective way.
The main reason lies in the dynamics of modern “hybrid” or “competitive
authoritarian” regimes, which seem to rest on particular combinations of formal
and informal norms. First, those regimes often seem to rely on particularly
problematic combinations of formal norms, rather than any single provision
operating independently.105 Scheppele has argued that the new Hungarian
constitution created a “Frankenstate” composed of the aggregation of a large
number of different elements that existed in other democratic states, although as
problematic rather than salutary features.106 The Hungarian constitution
amalgamated all of these features—such as gerrymandering, restrictions on judicial
jurisdiction, and less independent appointment procedures for courts and checking
institutions—into a particularly virulent combination.
A related point is that the negative effects of new constitutions may rest
heavily on contextual features, or on the interaction between formal and informal
norms, rather than on isolated features of the text. In Venezuela, for example,
President Chávez’s constitution in 1999 did increase presidential power, but merely
102.
See Jon Elster, Constitution-making in Eastern Europe: Rebuilding the Boat in the Open Sea, 71
PUB. ADMIN. 169, 188–92 (1993).
103. See Todd A. Eisenstadt et al., When Talk Trumps Text: The Democratizing Effects of Deliberation
during Constitution-Making, 1974–2011, 109 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 592 (2015).
104. See id.
105. See Kim L. Scheppele, The Rule of Law and the Frankenstate: Why Governance Checklists Do Not
Work, 26 GOVERNANCE 559 (2013).
106. Id. at 560–62.
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took a presidency that was perhaps the weakest in the region and made it one of the
stronger ones, although still well within Latin American norms. The greatly
increased effect of presidential power was caused by these formal changes coupled
with other aspects of the constitution where the president warped or worked around
formal norms; for example, by declining to effectively implement a civil society
commission that was supposed to exercise a significant role over judicial
appointments.107 By working around the commission, Chávez was able to control
those appointments unilaterally.108
In some cases, these problems may be overcome, although probably much
more readily at the regional than the international level. It is imaginable, for example,
that Latin America or Africa might eventually reach some consensus on the question
of presidential term limits. Unlike many other parts of a constitutional text, the
terms limits issue can arguably be analyzed in isolation, and at least within broad
parameters in a universal way. Term limits at least in presidential regimes may
exercise a clear influence on the political order irrespective of the content of the rest
of the constitution. Although Latin America currently seems to be going the other
way (more countries are currently removing term limits than adding them) one
could imagine the region eventually determining that at least some designs, like
allowing presidents to serve for life with no break, were too dangerous or too
associated with authoritarianism to be permissible.109 Even if some such norms
eventually emerge, however, they are unlikely to play a major role in preventing
democratic erosion.
C. International Civil Society and Best Practices
This leaves a set of possibilities that are more advisory in scope. First, many
commentators have noted the rise of involvement of international organizations
and NGOs in constitution-making over the past several decades. In some
circumstances, these groups can exercise a significant influence over the shape of
constitutional process and the resulting constitutional text. For example, the
international community has been heavily involved in constitution-making in some
post-conflict situations. Across many other cases, international civil society groups
have played a significant advisory role in the constitution-making process. An
extreme example of this is the constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the
constitution itself was drafted as part of an international peace agreement.110

107. See BREWER-CARIAS, supra note 2, at 226–44.
108. Id.
109. Both Honduras and Ecuador, for example, removed term limits in 2015, in the Ecuadorian
case through constitutional amendment and in the case of Honduras through a Supreme Court decision.
110.
See James C. O’Brien, The Dayton Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in FRAMING THE
STATE IN TIMES OF TRANSITION: CASE STUDIES IN CONSTITUTION MAKING 332, 332 (Laurel E.
Miller, ed., 2010) (“A key feature of the peace agreement that settled the conflict was a new constitution
for the new country, drafted by international mediators and negotiated by a handful of wartime leader
in the conference rooms of a U.S. Air Force base in Dayton, Ohio.”).
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The involvement of international organizations has plausibly improved
constitution-making across a range of cases. That said, there are a few cautions to
concluding that the involvement of these actors have effectively “internationalized”
constitution-making and ameliorated the problems noted in Part I. The first is
simply a point about selection. International involvement is not evenly distributed
or a part of every constitution-making process: these entities are heavily involved in
some processes but much less involved in others. The involvement of international
actors may to some degree be endogenous to other characteristics of the domestic
and international political landscape.
In part, levels of international involvement seem to depend on the interests of
international actors and the perceived importance of the country in question. At the
domestic level, involvement of international actors will often depend on the goals
of dominant political actors. In the ongoing process in Chile, for example, the
government has invited in a broad range of international actors, perhaps as a way
to increase domestic legitimacy and support despite right-wing opposition.111 But in
both Hungary (2011) and Venezuela (1999), international actors played virtually no
role in discussions around constitutional process and text.112 In both cases, political
leaders who had engineered a rapid and exclusionary process plausibly viewed
international involvement as an obstacle to their aims. Those cases where
democratic erosion is most possible may also be cases where international
involvement tends to be slight.
The other major caution is about the state of the field, or the existing and
perhaps inevitable gaps in our levels of knowledge. International involvement can
without question be helpful in showing domestic designers the full range of
comparative experience and in demonstrating the pitfalls and promise of
approaches tried elsewhere. Still, best practices are sometimes formulated without
a sufficient empirical base, or on a small number of case studies. The popular
participation norm, for example, is one often pushed by international actors,
sometimes based on the paradigmatic case of South Africa.113 However, as noted in
the prior section, the empirical evidence for the impact of participation is mixed,
and we still do not fully understand its tradeoffs with other aspects of the
constitutional process. There are real limits to the advice that can plausibly be given
by international organizations and NGOs.

111. See, e.g., Field & HQ Update: Chile, 5 THE U.N. CONSTITUTIONAL 10 (2015) (discussing
U.N. advisory involvement and support for the Chilean constitution-making process),
http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/TheUNConstitutional_Edition5_Summer2
016.pdf.
112.
See Miklós Bánkuti, Gábor Halmai, and Kim Lane Scheppele, Hungary’s Illiberal Turn:
Disabling the Constitution, 23 J. OF DEMOC. 138, 141–42 (2012); see also BREWER-CARIAS, supra note 2, at
62.
113. See generally Franck & Thiruvengadam, supra note 95; see also Hart, supra note 95, at 20.
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D. Advisory Bodies

Finally, in some cases advisory organizations at the international level have
played a role in monitoring constitutional change and constitution-making. A good
example is the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe, which has become a
relevant actor in some of the recent threats to democracy in Eastern Europe. The
Commission’s mandate is advisory: it has the ability to review legal measures and
other instruments and to make recommendations in order to move towards “the
dissemination and consolidation of a common constitutional heritage” in Europe.114
Since 2010, for example, the Commission has offered several opinions
reviewing the new Hungarian constitution as well as laws intended to implement it.
In a 2011 opinion, the Commission critiqued the exclusionary, non-participatory,
and rapid and non-transparent nature of the constitution-making process.115 It also
expressed concerns over some of the substantive provisions of the new
constitution, such as the limitations on the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court.
The Commission also issued opinions reviewing several of the “cardinal laws”
intended to implement key parts of the constitution: it critiqued several aspects of
the laws regulating the judiciary, Constitutional Court, and prosecution service.116
The Venice Commission’s work in the Hungarian case, as well as other recent
Eastern European episodes, has been subject to criticism.117 Critics have argued, for
example, that the Commission’s analyses have tended to take pieces of legislation in
isolation, rather than holistically – a variant of the “Frankenstate” problem noted
above. They have also argued that the Commission has demonstrated insufficient
knowledge of the facts on the ground.118 But at least potentially, an advisory
commission approach offers advantages over other models on both scores. A body
like the Venice Commission is not restricted to determining whether domestic
actors have followed their own rules, or analyzing aspects of procedure or substance
in isolation. It can instead potentially make a relatively holistic review of the effect
114.
http://www.venice.coe.int/WebForms/pages/?p=01_Presentation (last visited Jan. 12,
2017).
115. See European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), Opinion on
the New Constitution of Hungary, Op. No. 621/2011, (Jun. 20, 2011).
116. See European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), Opinion on
Act CLXII of 2011 on the Legal Status and Remuneration of Judges and Act CLXI of 2011 on the Organisation
and Administration of Courts of Hungary, Op. No. 663/2012 (Mar. 19, 2012); see also European Commission
for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), Opinion on Act CLXIII of 2011 on the Prosecution
Service and Act CLXIV of 2011 on the Status of the Prosecution Employees and the Prosecution Career of Hungary,
Op. No. 668/2012 (Jun. 19, 2012); see also European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice
Commission), Opinion on the Cardinal Acts on the Judiciary that were Amended Following the Adoption of Opinion
CDL-AD(2012)001 on Hungary, Op. No. 683/2012, (Oct. 15, 2012).
117. See, e.g., Joakim Nergelius, The Role of the Venice Commission in Maintaining the Rule of Law in
Hungary and in Romania, in CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS IN THE EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL AREA:
THEORY, LAW, AND POLITICS IN HUNGARY AND ROMANIA 291, 291 (Armin von Bogdandy & Pál
Sonnevend, eds., 2015).
118. See Armin von Bogdandy & Pál Sonnevend, Preface, in CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS IN THE
EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL AREA: THEORY, LAW, AND POLITICS IN HUNGARY AND ROMANIA,
supra note 117, at vii.
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of procedure or substantive provisions, and one based on the impact actions and
provisions in practice, rather than simply on paper. Moreover, the Venice
Commission is not restricted to identifying violations of domestic and international
law, but can instead push states towards best procedural and substantive practices,
in light of common European constitutional heritage.119
Of course, the advisory nature of the Commission’s review may limit its
effectiveness, which is another common critique.120 The Hungarian government
made some legal changes in response to the Commission’s recommendations, but
it did not change its approach; the changes were generally cosmetic.121 The review
of an advisory body like the Commission could gain more teeth if it was utilized by
other international actors with binding authority to sanction a noncompliant state.
In Europe, this is at least a theoretical possibility because of the existence of actors
like the European Commission. In 2014 The European Commission adopted a
multi-step procedure for responding to threats to the rule of law, but it is too soon
to know whether it will take effective action in response to significant problems
noted by the Venice Commission.122 Advisory bodies may also influence
constitution-making through other routes: they might, for example, embolden
domestic institutions like courts to take tougher stances against abusive
constitution-making practices.
One could imagine seeking to generalize advisory bodies like the Venice
Commission outside of the European context. President Marzouki’s International
Constitutional Court proposal envisioned an advisory role for the Court in
developing best practices and analyzing national legal changes, in addition to an
adjudicative role.123 But it would be very difficult to develop international best
practices, at least in terms of constitution-making, for the reasons noted above.
Perhaps more feasible would be the expansion of advisory bodies at the regional
level, where problems of reaching substantive and procedural consensus might be
less dire, if still complex.
Take Latin America as a potential case study. Although significant human
rights and other regional institutions do exist in the region, the overall network of
international institutions is much less dense than what is found in Europe, and those
that do exist are less effective. It may not be easy for regional states to agree even
on an advisory commission to govern domestic constitutional and legal design.
Moreover, even if states did agree on such a body, it is unclear what a “Latin
American heritage” in constitutional and legal design would look like.

119. See Nergelius, supra note 117, at 308.
120. See id. at 300.
121. See id. at 293–96.
122.
See, e.g., Tomasz T. Koncewicz, Of Constitutional Defiance, Migration and Borrowing of
Unconstitutional Tactics and European Resistance, INT’L J. CONST. L. BLOG, (Aug. 17, 2016),
http://www.iconnectblog.com/2016/08/of-constitutional-defiance-migration-and-borrowing-ofunconstitutional-tactics-and-european-resistance (analyzing these provisions with respect to Poland).
123. U.N. GAOR, 69th Sess., 9th plen. mtg. at 13–14.
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The recent constitution-making experiences in the Andes, for example, offer
both a procedural and substantive challenge to prevailing liberal models. From a
procedural perspective, they permit exclusion of prevailing political elite in return
for participatory processes that offer input to historically marginalized groups.124
From a substantive perspective, they perhaps weaken horizontal institutions of
accountability in return for strengthening direct popular control over the governing
class via devices like recalls and referenda and the inclusion of new forms of
rights.125 In both cases, the basic idea is that liberal democratic models can stand as
obstacles to the achievement of social transformation and the inclusion of
marginalized groups. The existence of this model shows that even within a region
where there is broad agreement on basic norms of democracy, broad divergence in
both the process and substance of constitution-making can persist. This
disagreement does not make the establishment of advisory bodies impossible, but
it does significantly complicate the task.
III.

CONCLUSION

This article had two major goals. The first was to argue that the particular
institutional and legal circumstances of constitution-making mean that domestic
restraint is often problematic, and this absence of restraint is associated with
significant common problems: the erosion of democracy and increase in political
tension. The second was to suggest that international actors give some additional
attention to this problem, by reviewing the ways various existing models could be
strengthened to take better account of it.
The review of potential international solutions in Part II suggests that abusive
constitution-making is a very difficult issue to tackle at the international level. All of
the plausible solutions— democracy clauses, international norms, best practices,
and advisory bodies—have substantial drawbacks. Some are very difficult to
deepen; others might threaten to do more harm to domestic constitution-making
than good, either by privileging the wrong goals or by imposing uniform models on
what is a very contextual process. But flawed is, in this context, a long way from
useless. Given the importance of the threat posed by some acts of constitutionmaking, the most sensible solution is to seek realistic and incremental progress
across a range of the models reviewed here.

124. See Cameron & Sharpe, supra note 23, at 101–02.
125. See, e.g., Jennifer McCoy, Venezuela Under Chávez: Beyond Liberalism, in LATIN AMERICA’S
LEFT TURNS: POLITICS, POLICIES, AND TRAJECTORIES OF CHANGE 81, 93–94 (Maxwell A. Cameron
& Eric Hershberg, eds., 2010).

